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VALUES AND THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE:
PRINCIPLES1
HUGH LACEY
Swarthmore College

ABSTRACT
In this paper I will propose six principies governtng the proper
role of moral and social values in the amduct of scientific uivestigation I offer them for your consideration, and hope that together we can sharpen thetr formulatton, explore their
tions and test their acceptability In malang my proposals I
draw constderably from my recent books, Valores e Atividade
Cientifica (VAC, Lacey 1988) and Is Science Value Free ? Values and Scientific Understanding (SVF, Lacey 1999a) The detailed argument, and elaboration of the techruLal notions that I
use are to be found In them (and summartzed in Lacey 1999c)
The sketch of the argument that I offer here is intended to (lisplay the mottvatton behind the proposed principies

In common self-portrayals of the modern scientific tradition
there is no proper role for moral and social values to play at
the core of scientific activity values have nothmg to do with
accepting theones or with providing direction for "fundamental" scientific research At the core, the rationallyrelevant work is done by the empincal data, the cognitive
values, and the ability and ingenuity of scientists who, m
the light of available data, aim to accept theones that mamfest the cognitive values highly (Lacey 1997a), and whose
research gams direction from anring to obtam high (and
sometimes higher) mandestations of the cognitive values
theones that progressively provide understanding of large
Pnnapia, 3(1) (1999) 57-85 Pubhshed by Editora da UFSC, and
NEL, Epistemology and Logic Research Group, Federal University of
Santa Catarina, Brazil
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classes of phenomena From this account of the core of soentific activity there follows just one principie concerning
the place of values in relation to it, I state it (roughly) as
follows
The "no-values" principie Permit no role to moral and
social values in the judgments involved in the choice (acceptance and iejection) of theones and in setting the direction of "fundamental" scientific research
Fundamental scientific research, of course, has material
and social conditions, and whether or not they are provided depends on moral and social values, and on how
highly science itself is assessed as a social value But then
the values influence not the content and direction of the
investigation but its histoncal rhythms 'The relative ranking of science as a social value leads also to another principie, not one that addresses the core of inquiry, but one reflecting that the pursuit of science does not justify any
means
The "ethical restraints" principie The conduct of science, especially of experimental inquiry, is subject to ethical
constramts
Clearly how this principie in interpreted concretely will
draw upon subsidiary principies about what counts as
"ethical" — a matter that cannot be settled internally by
science
Generally the two principies do not conflict On occasion, however, research may have to be re-directed in the
absence of ethically-acceptable means for following a desired research direction But that does not bnng values 'rito
the judgments involved in choosing theones, at most it may
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require withholding judgments on certam theones I
not discuss "ethical constraints" further in this paper (but
see Appendix 1)
Clearly not ali actual saence accords in fact with "novalues " For the proponents of the principie this shows that
sometimes, regrettably, "bias" and "distortion" enter int°
the core of science Nevertheless the aim rem= (for them)
to provide sound understanding of the natural world — as
it is independent of its relations with mvestigators free
from human-ongmated distortions In order to ensure fuller
adherence to "no-values," the principie may be supplemented by institutional and practical procedures and prescriptions (e g)
• Engage in empincal soaohistoncal investigation of
the (possible) sources of biases, and take steps to
eliminate them in pracnce This may involve the
identification and adoption of secondary principies
(e g) "use double-bhnd methods in the evaluation of
chnical mais," or (in stuches with significant social
implications) "make sure that a wide range of valueoutiooks are represented among the members of the
research community "
• Tram scientists to adopt the "scientific ethos" (Culpam 1998)
The "no values" principie concerns the core of saentific
activity Those who endorse it recognize that, when we
move away from the core, values may come to play a vanety of legitimate roles with respect to (e g) setting the chrection and aims of applied research, appraising the legaimacy of applications, providing sources of ideas in the "context of discovery" and of motivation to engage in research I
will leave these "peripheral" matters aside (see SVF 12-19)
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The account I have Just sketched in readily recognizable,
and as attraction is obvious It is reinforced by widely held
views about scientific realism, matenalist metaphysics, and
the subjective character of values Nevertheless, "no-values"
is systematically violated throughout the practices of modern natural saence — and, I beheve, there is no way in
which they could be reconstituted so as to conform to it
At first sight this may seem to be quite implausible How
could values be playing a role at the core ? After ali, the
very categones deployed in scientific theones preclude that
theones have value judgments among their entailments —
for they are chosen so that they can represent phenomena
and their possibilities in telins of their being generated from
underlying structure, process, interaction and law, in abstraction from any place they may have in relation to social
arrangements, human hves and expenence, from any link
with value Theones simply do not address matters of vaiues, scientific methodology has been designed to ensure
this Yes! But theones constructed with these categones are
suited to apphcation rnuch more for those value-outlooks
that endorse the shaping of soaety on the basis of technological implementanons, more precisely those that include
(what I call) "the modern valuation of control" (see below)
Concerning matters of application (for the most part) modem science is not neutral (SVF ch 10) We will see that this
reflects a role that the modern valuation of control is playing in setting the direction of scientific research The methodological rule, "Don't deploy value-laden terms in the construction of theones," is not sufficient to ensure compliance
with the "no-values" principie
The remainder of the article will be devoted to motivating and formulating a set of normative principies governing
values and the conduct of science I leave it open whether
or not the set is complete, but 1 will argue that each pnna-
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pie can not only be defended, but also — unlike "no-values"
— be conformed with in actual saentific practice

******
1 thmk that part of the "no-values" principie is correct
put it this way
Principie 1 — Imparnality Accept a theory of a domam
of phenomena if and only if a manifests the cognitive values to a suitably high degree in the light of available empincal data, and reject a theory if and only if a theory inconsistent with a has been accepted — so, permit no role to
moral and social values in the judgments involved
choosing theones
Impartiatity does not depend on the above-mentioned
methodological rule to keep value-iaden terms out of theones, and a presupposes the distinction between cognitive
and other kinds of values (SVF chs 4 and 10, Lacey 1997,
1999b, c) The only values to which a permits a role in
making sound theory choices are cognaive values 2 To further the likelihood of as bemg adhered to Pnnaple 1
should be accompamed by the subsidiary principie
(a) Pay attention to empincal sociohistoncal studies of
the mechanisms of departure fi-om imparttality, and
test that one's judgments of theory acceptance are
unaffected by these mechanisms
One mechanism is particularly worthy of note (see Appendix 2 for further mechanisms) It has two sources (i)
Theones are evaluated not only for their cognitive value
but also for their stgnificance (the potential social value of
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their apphcations — SVF 15) (o) Because of the matenal
and social condimos needed for research, in their actual
manifestation it may not be easy to separate cognitive from
some other values (though they remam disttnct), so that
under these conchtions judgments of acceptance and significance will effectively tend to coincide Consider (e g) a
statement I recently read that purports to state a simple fact
not to suggest any cnticism "By its very nature, biotechnology tends towards pnvatization" (Postlewait, Parker &
Zilberman, 1993) Given the material and social condimos
under which biotechnology research currently proceeds,
acceptance of biotechnology theones (in accord with imparticdity) may be virtually mseparable from appraising them as
especially significant for projects that express values linked
with pnvatization While this is compatible with impartiality, to releu theones because they are not potentially significant for a value-outlook is not Where the manifestamos of
cognitive and certain other values appear to be virtually
inseparable, this may become too fine a point to be geouinely sensitive to — that is the mechanism of departure from
impartiality worthy of note, a involves subtly giving a social
value play alongside (or above) the cognitive values Thus
(e g) theones in agnculture, which query the possibilines
touted in the name of biotechnology and affirm the greater
potential of developments of traditional approaches to agnculture, are often not only not investigated, but outnght
rejected by researchers with dose ties to agnbusiness It
may be soundly accepted that a biotechnology theory encapsulates agricultura! possibilities, of interest given the
values of pnvatization, it does not follow from this that a
radically different theory (or set of theones) does not encapsulate possibilities of greater significance from the perspective of another value-outlook — e g, one that especially
values the empowerment of local farmers and sustaming
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social and ecological condi:n.0ns that support widespread
well-being — or possibilities whose rehable encapsulation
casts doubt on the legitimacy of some of the practices of
biotechnology-informed agnculture
This discussion suggests two further subsichary principies
(b) Make every effort to separate judgments of acceptance of theones from judgments of their significance for particular value-outiooks
(c) When a soundly accepted theory is significant for
one's value-outiook, scrutinize ngorously the rejection of any theones that (if soundly accepted) would
be significant for rival value-outlooks or that would
tend to undermine the legitimation of practices informed by one's value-outiook
Impartiality captures the first part of the "no-values n principie, but the second part remains elusive The goal to generate and consolidate theones manifesting the cognitive
values highly progressively of more and more domains of
phenornena and possibilines provides (and can provide) no
direction to scientific investigation Put like that, it is left
completely unspecified (for any domam of phenomena)
what are the relevant kmds of empincal data to procure,
the appropnate descriptive categones for observational reports, the kinds of theones to posit for further investiganon, the kmds of possibilities to attempt to encapsulate,
and the kinds of questions that may be addressed effectively Uniess such matters are specified the cognitive values
cannot play their role as cntena of choice among competmg theones I think that the goal just stated expresses In
broad terms the goal of scientific inquiry (SVF ch 5) —
where 1 include under "science" any form of systematic em-
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pincal inquiry, but it can be pursued only under (what I
call) a strategy ("estrategia de restrição e seleção" VAC,
Lacey 1997a), whose key roles are to constrain the kinds of
theones that may be entertained and, reaprocally, to select
the kinds of empincal data that acceptable theones should
fit Only when a strategy has been adopted can questions
be formulated so as so be open to effective empincal investigation, and different kmds of questions often require the
adoption of different strategies Which strategy to adopt
cannot be settled by appeal to the cogrutive values alone,
and often not without appeal to moral and social values 3
Consider the followmg two questions (cf SVF ch 8,
VAC ch 6) The "maximizing" question How can we
maximize production of a crop under conditions — use of
fertihzers, pest and weed management techmques, water,
machinery, strains of seeds, etc — that can be widely rephcate& And the "local well-being" question How can we
produce a crop so that ali the people in the region of the
production will gain access to a well balanced diet in a context that enhances local agency and well-bemg and sustams
the environment?
Both questions call for systematic empincal inquiry, both
belong to the province of science Adherence to particular
social values might lead to pnontizing one or the other but,
in both cases, sound answers will be rooted rn empincal
data and appraised in the light of the standard critena, i e,
of how well they manifest the cognitive values empincal
adequacy, consihence, explanatory scope, predictive and
explanatory power and the like Answers to "maximizing"
can be informed directly by current research in biotechnology (BT) on genetically modified plants," local well-being"
addressed directly m research in agroecology (AE) Research proj ects of BT and AE are conducted under different
strategies Those of BT are typical of research conducted
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under (what I call) mateltalist strategtes
Most of modern science adopts virtually exclusively vanous forms of materialist strategies 4 theones are constramed
to those that represent phenomena in terms of their being
generated from underlying structure, process, interaction and
law, abstractmg from any place they may have in relation
to social arrangements, human lives and expenence, from
any link with value (thus deploying no teleological, intentional or sensory categones) Put another way, theones are
constramed so as to encapsulate the material posstbdttles of
things, those possibilities that can be represented as generable from underlying structure, process, interaction and
law, in abstraction from whatever social, human and ecological possibilities may also be open to them Reciprocally,
empincal data are selected, not only to meet the condition
of intersubjectivity, but also so that their descriptive categones contam generally quantitative terms, applicable in virtue of measurement, instrumental intervention and (above
all) experimental operations
AE, it should be noted, is not conducted under matenalist strategies (though it may mclude materialist research in
a subordmate way), as immediate objective is to investigate
the possibilities of agncultural systems considered as
wholes, and so rt does not abstract from the social, human
and ecological dimensions of things (Lacey 1999c), so that
the possibilities of principal mterest to it — of plants, seeds,
etc — will not generally coincide with the possibilities encapsulated under the strategies of BT 'There may be genume possibilities of both kmds, even if — under current histoncal condinons — rt may not be possible for both kmds
to be realized together sigmficantly (Lacey 1999c) 5
1 now turn to the question Why has the modern scientific commurnty adopted materialist strategies almost exclusively? Why, e g, to consider a particular, does it tend to
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be more interested in BT than AE ?) What (if any) are the
ranonal grounds for the vatually uncontested adoption of
matenahst strategies in modern science7 Elsewhere I have
considered and rejected several answers to this question
that derive from such sources as matenalist metaphysics,
scientific realism (SVF ch 6) and Kuhn's philosophy of
science (SVF ch 7) (See also Lacey 1999c ) The answer I
favor rests upon a mutually reinforcing interaction (deeply
embodied in modern societies) between research conducted
under materialist strategies and commament to the modern
valuation of control (The details and the argument are
developed in SVF ch 6)6 I emphasize that I am putting
social values at the center of the rational grounds for the
general pnvilege granted materialist strategies in modern
science, in particular inquines, addressed to specific kmds of
questions, there may be good reason to adopt materialist
strategies that have little to do wah the interaction that I
have idennfied
If I am nght that the mteraction constautes the key part
of the rational grounds (and not just the social explanation)
for the pnvilege, then there remains no compelling reason
for those who contest the modern valuation of control (hke
those who engage in AE) not to explore alternative strategies that interact in mutually reinforang ways with their
pnontized values of local well-being, social justice and ecological and (e g) to put at the center of attention
"local well-being" rather than "maximizing” (SVF ch 8,
VAC ch 6) Put another way, there is no rational obstacle
to adopting strategies on the ground that theones that may
become soundly accepted under them (in accord with 1mpartiality) would be especially significant for the valueoutlooks that interact in mutually reinforcing ways with the
strategies
My answer to the question posed and the imphcations 1
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have drawn remam m accord with tmparttaltty They license
neither rejecting soundly consohdated results gained under
one strategy on the ground that they lack significance for
value-outlooks linked with a favored strategy, nor acceptmg
theories on the ground of their likely or hoped-for
cance The goal remams to generate and consolidate theories that manifest the cognitive values highly Thus strategies should be held to the condition of fruttfulness under
them theories that manifest the cognitive values highly actually are and continue to be gamed Fruitfulness, of
course, can only be expected with the passage of time and
the necessary material and social conditions bemg provided
for carrying out the research, but, granted this, a strategy's
failing to display fruitfulness is a compelling ground to (liscontinue research under
There emerges from this discussion a picture in which
there are two Iogically distinct moments involved in the
processes that lead to choosing theories At the first moment, a strategy is adopted when, in effect, one lays out
the most general terms the kinds of phenomena and possiMines chosen to be investigated, in the case of materiahst
strategies, the material possibilities of things and phenomena In spaces where their possibilities are exhausted by their
material possibilities Then (logically) at the second moment, from the array of theories provisionally entertamed
that fit the constraints of the strategy, one of them may
come to be accepted in accordance with impartialtty, and
thus encapsulate what the genume possibilities (of the kinds
under investigation) are Subject to fruitfulness, it is legitimate for moral and social values to influence strongly the
adoption of a strategy (Adopt the strategies of BT m order
to further the commercialization of agriculture, or those of
AE m order to help to preserve biodiversity ) At the second
moment, however, only the data (and other accepted theo-
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nes) and the cognitive values are relevant The important
thing is to keep the roles of the social and cognitive values
separate, and the legitimate role of social values stnctly confined to the first moment Social values do not have a
proper role at the second moment acting alongstde the cognitive values, but only at the first moment when strategies
are adopted Since continumg to adopt strateges is subject
to ther fruitfulness, adopting strategies is both linked dialectically with values and under long-term empirical constramt
Motivated by this long discussion, I propose several further principies, and subsidianes that should accompany
them and help in their interpretation

Principie 2 — Separation of strategy adoption and the.
ory choice Keep the moments of strategy adoption and
theory choice logically separate
(a) Define the strategies under which research is beng
conducted suffiaently exphatly so that the grounds
for ther adoption can be formulated and appraised

Principie 3 — Multiple strategies Recognize the legitimacy and indispensability of systematic empincal research
conducted under a vanety of strategies, where a strategy
may mteract in mutually renforang ways with (different)
particular values (and be largely motivated by the adoption
of these values), but do not engage In research under strategies that, following extended and appropnately supported
efforts, do not meet the test of fruitfulness
(a) Ensure that researchers, who hold a vanety of
value-outlooks, are represented among the community of investigators
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Principie 4 — Neutrality Permit research to be conducted
under a suffiaent range of strategies so that ali viable valueoutlooks can come to draw evenhandedly from the body of
theories soundly accepted in accordance with imparttaitty
those ones (respectively) that are significant for them, and
so that the full range of side-effects of applications of theories can be systematically investigated and evaluated
Where the common view, stated at the outset, aims to
achieve neutrality by actmg according to the "no-values”
principie and the methodological rule (effectively) to conduct research under materialist strategies, my alternative
aspires to neutraltty through expanding the range of available soundly accepted theories by permating the deployment of multiple strategies each of which influenced by different value-outlooks (See SVF ch 10 for more on neutraltty ) I reject granting exclusivity to research conducted
under materialist strategies Yet, I don't want to consider
them simply on a par with other strategies Their extraordmary fruitfulness precludes treating them m this way
More importantly, control of natural objects plays a role in
ali fornis of life regardless of value-outlook adopted — the
modern valuation of control is not adopted in ali valueoutlooks but, where it is not, control subordinated to other
social values is so that we reasonably expect that, for any
viable value-outlook, some products of research conducted
under materialist strategies will be sigmficant to some extent Thus, research conducted under materialist strategies,
appropriately subordinated to the desired social values and
not (e g) adopted to the exclusion of indigenous forms of
knowledge, will be a constauent of research under ali
strategies (SVF ch 10)
It should also be noted that under materialist strategies
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alone important side-effects of applications cannot be appropnately investigated Consider the case of BT in agnculture Under matenahst strategies the effectiveness and efficiency of certam of its applications can be soundly tested —
questions like "maximizing" can be answered But that, under the material and social conditions that enable the applications to be made, seeds become turned ever more completely imo commodities is (for those whose compass is hmaed to matenalist strategies) an externahty to the scientific
research Moreover, that there may be important "lost possibilities" occasioned by displacement of traditional agncultural methods necessaated by the new methods simpiy cannot be addressed without mvestigation that takes into account the knowledge (and its possibilities for improvement,
as in AE) that informed the tradinonal methods That the
supporters of BT-shaped agnculture take for granted that
there are no important lost possibilities so that their methods provide the only way to feed the world's growmg
population provides an instance of the operation of mechanism of departing from Impartzaltty discussed earher in this
ande (SVF ch 8, and the numerous references caed
there, VAC ch 6, Lacey 1999b, c) That mecharnsm functions most powerfully, and imperceptibly, where the exciusivity of matenalist strategies is not questioned and where
the modern valuation of control is presumed to represent a
universal — in the centers of power and influence of the
advanced industrial countnes and In the forces that are
driving the entrenchment of "globalization "

*****
So far I have suggested some principies that should govern
the role that val Lies play in the conduct of scientific inquiry,
ones that have import for epistemic and application issues,
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but I have not discussed anything about the nature of values Elsewhere (SVF ch 2, VAC ch 2) I have developed a
view in which values of vanous kinds (personal, moral, social, etc) are held together in complex sets or value-outlooks
(Lacey 1999b) rendered coherent and ordered by certain
presuppositions about human nature and about what is
possible I cannot defend this view here According to it,
however, the presuppositions of a value-outlook are open to
some measure of empincal investigation, so that — while it
remains true that theones have no value judgments among
their entailments — the outcome of sciennfic inquiry can
undermine the rational credentials of a value-outlook (SVF
ch 4, Lacey 1997b) Let us explore what implications this
may have for my claim that strategies may be adopted in
view of ther mutually reinforcing interactions with values I
will begin this exploranon by looking more closely at the
modern valuation of control and its presuppositions
The modern valuation of control may be arnculated as
having the followmg components (SVF ch 6 VAC ch
5)?
• 'The instrumental value of natural objects is dissoclated from other forms of value, then the exercise of
control over them becomes per se a social value not
systematically subordinated to (or balanced with)
other social values
• Expanding (via research and development, and the
creation of new technologies) the range of natural
objects over which human control may be effectively
exerased, and the range of phenomena that can
thereby be brought about, is very highly valued, as
is its widespread institutional embodiment
• Control is the charactenstic human stance to adopt
towards natural objects Exercising control and,
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above ali engaging in the projects in which our powers to control are expanded, are essential and primary ways in which we express ourselves as modern
human beings, in which are cultwated such personal
tí virtues" as creativity, inventiveness, initiative,
boldness in the face of nsks, autonomy, rationality
and practicality Thus, an environment which is
shaped so that many and vaned possibilines of control may be routinely actuahzed In the course of
daily life, one dommated by technological objects, is
highly valued, as is the spread of technology into
more and more domams of life, and wherever possible problems tend to be defined as having a technological solunon
• The Implementation of novel technologies has prima
faue legitimacy In particular, a measure of social
disruption is tolerated for the sake of implementing
novel technologies, the values that may be mamfested In social arrangements are, to a significant extent, subordinate to the value of implementing novel
technologies It follows that it is legitimate to attend
to side-effects of technological implementations
largely as "second thoughts "
The modern valuation of control is highly manifested
and embodied throughout the world today and endorsed
by the predommant institutions of power, it is capable of
much higher manifestation In more socienes and In more
domains of life, and we may expect that the trend towards
its higher manifestation will continue for quite some time
At the same time, the ranonal grounds for adopting the
modern valuation of control, as distinct from the factors
that expiam its widespread adopnon, derive from the following diverse set of presuppositions (perhaps among oth-
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ers) (a) Ongoing technological innovation serves the wellbeing of human bemgs m general since it is indispensable
for "development," and thus for a just soaety (b) Technological solutions can be found (and will be put into effect)
for virtually ali problems, including those occasioned by the
"side-effects" of technological implementanons (c) The
modern valuation of control represents a set of universal
values, part of any ranonally legitimated value-outlook today, whose further manifestation is de facto desired by virtually ali who come into contact with as products (d)
There are no significant possibilities for value-outlooks, not
contaming the modern valuanon of control, that can be
actualized in the foreseeable future (e) When we exercise
control over objects, informed by sound understanding
gamed under matenahst strategies, we are dealing with objects as they are in themselves as part of "the material
world" — and that is why projects shaped by the modern
valuation of control have been so spectacularly successful
I cannot make the argument here, but I thmk it is quite
clear that if a number of these presuppositions cannot be
sustamed, then the rational grounds for endorsing the
modern valuation of control dissolve — regardless of as
widespread embodiment in contemporary social structures
and the support it ganis from the institutions of power Notice that, with the possible exception of the last one, ali of
the presuppositions are arguably open to empincal investigation, so that the rationahty of adopting the modern
valuation of control would be enhanced by their gaming
positive empincal support
This puts us into an interesting dialectical situation I
have claimed that the principal gro ands for the almost exclusive adoption of matenahst strategies in modern natural
saence lie in the mutually reinforcing interaction between
them and the modern valuation of control Its rationality,
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then, is tied to the rationahty of adopting the modern
valuation of control, and thus to the acceptability of presuppositions (a)-(e) If these presuppositions lack empincal
support, or especially if the evidence counts against them,
the emphases of current scientific practices would have to
be called into question Ongoing research under matenahst
strategies itself cannot resolve the matter for its results
barely speak to the presuppositions Ironically, or paradoxically, evidence for the presuppositions — and thus rational
support for the almost exclusive adoption of matenahst
strategies — could be obtamed only by engaging In research
under non-matenalist strategies
Consider, e g, presupposition (d) that there are no sigmficant possibilities in the foreseeable future for the significant embodiment of value-outlooks that do not contam the
modern valuation of control (see Lacey 1997b for discussion
of how to investigate "future possibilities") It is backed by
vanous more specific assumptions (e g) the "no lost possibilities" assumption (referred to above), one often deployed
to legitimate the rapid and vast Implementation of BTInformed agnculture Now, research under matenalist
strategies can produce answers to questions like "maximizing," but not to "local well-bemg " But "no lost possibilities"
can gani no empmcal support apart from attempts to investigate questions hke the latter empincally It follows that it
is important to define strategies (of AE) under which "local
well-being" can be addressed In a systematic empincal way,
if presuppositions like "no lost possibilities" are to be removed from the realm of the ideological Such strategies, as
already indicated, need not reject research under matenalist
strategies entirely, only subordinate rt in a way that farming
practices, and the objects interacted with m the course of
them, are not abstracted from the social and ecological relations into which they enter (Lacey 1999c) — they may well
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exhibit continuity with the "traditional knowledge" of a
culture (SVF ch 8 VAC ch 6) They may turn not to be
fruitful, but we cannot know that in advance of engaging
research under them
This reflection motivates another principie intended to
complement Principie 4
Principie 5 — Rationality of adoption of strategy Permit
research to be conducted under a suffiaent range of strategies so that the presuppositions of the value-outiooks that
interact rn mutually reinforcing ways with particular strategies can be addressed (to the extent possible) in systematic
empincal ways
Following this principie would serve to minimize the Influence of ideology and of disputed values upon settmg the
direction of scientific research It would balance emphasis
on matenalist strategies with consideration of the presuppositions and conditions of their adoption, and thus permit
the question of human well-being to be put right at the
center of attention
Philip Kitcher has wntten
To claim that the saences achieve certain epistemic goals
that we nghtly pnze is not enough — for the practice of saence might be disadvantageous to human well being In more
chrect, practical ways A convincing account of practical
progress will depend ultunately on articulating an ideal of
human flounshing against wluch we can appraise vanous
strategies for doing science The extreme posmons are clear
At one pole it is suggested that science, as it is practiced, is a
terrible thing, and that human beings want none of it, at
the other, that suence, as we have fashioned it, is already
perfect Neaher extreme is likely to be right (Kacher 1993
391)
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conclude by proposing one more principie, whose mstitutional and political ramifications urgently need exploration for they concern the relationship of science to democratic institutions
Principie 6 — Impact on human flourishing Adopt a
strategy only in the light of reflection, that draws upon
relevant empincal investigation, of the likely (and potential)
Impact on human flounshing of conductmg research under
it, of providing the material and social conditions required
for the research, and of its potential applications
(a) Pay attention to the vanous conceptions of human
flounshmg that are carned by contemporary groups,
not only within predommant institutions but also
among movements which contest the values embodied in these institutions,8 and explore how their
presuppositions could be submitted to empincal test,
then ask should strategies be adopted in research
(additional to or in place of those currently being
followed) that interact dialectically with the values
that flow from some or other of these concepnons?
Following these six principies would open up to empincal scrunny the presuppositions that shape the directions of
sciennfic inquiry and legitimate its applications, thereby
expanding markedly the scope of systematic empincal inquiry — without impinging on, and indeed enhancmg, the
value of impartially gamed knowledge Se, following them
would further the cognitive (epistemic) ends usually linked
with suentific practice and, at the same time, contnbute to
furthenng human flounshing It would keep us honest and
serve humanay, it would also run counter to the reigning
tendencies of our age
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Appenchx 1: ethwal restramts
The "no-values" principie is a composite of tmpartiatuy
(Principie 1) and autonomy scientific research (at least "basic" research) is or should be dnven by cognitive consideranons, thence, e g, government (other repositones of power
and bearers of moral and social value) should not play a
role is setting or restncting saentific agendas (On autonomy, see SVF chs 4 and 10 Lacey 1999b, c) But the
genuine value of expanding the stock of theones accepted
in accord with impartiality does not overnde ali other vaiues Certain ethical restramts upon the conduct of saentific
(especially experimental) inquiry are clearly appropnate,
e g, that the human nghts of experimental subjects be respected and that public standards concerning health, safety
and environmental protection be met Thus, even for those
who endorse "no values," there may be a need to "compromise" with autonorny Working out the details of the compromise, and who should be involved in working it out, are
important moral and political issues
Where ethical factors restram experimental research,
gaming some of the data needed to test some theones' acceptability may be hindered, then, the interest in testing
these theones becomes superseded, at least temporanly,
until some other (ethically acceptable) mode of testing is
devised (The value of scientific knowledge always remams
subordinate to that of the well-being of human beings ) I
doubt that anyone would deny the legitimacy of ethical
restraints on experimental practice, even where they are
likely to have some (neganve) Impact on the outcomes of
soentific inquiry Where these restramts are appropnate,
the pubhc (and thus the state) has an interest In their being
acknowledged and acted upon, and the state may legislate
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to ensure that they are acted upon, though the scientific
commumty tends to be reluctant to accept this, no doubt
feanng that it might provide an excuse for more intrusive
state intervention To see how legislation for ethical restraints may be legitimate (and how its necessity can be
circumvented), I offer a few thoughts about how to think
about ethical restraints by lookmg bnefly at the currently
controversial issue of the use of animais in experimental
research (These thoughts need to be developed so that the
proper balance between "ethical restraints" and my six
principies can be articulated in detail )
Is passing legislanon about the use and treattnent of
animais in research an appropnate way for the state to intervene in sciennfic research? In general, I think not,
though there may be cases where such legislation may be
expedient and, provided that it is developed in dose collaboration with expenenced members of the scientific
community, constructive I do not query that the trade-off
between "animal nghts" and "freedom of research" is properly a matter for public debate In that debate, it is commonly argued that the potential ganis for human health
and well-being from the research using animais outweigh
any clanns made on behalf of animal nghts Nevertheless,
the well-being and proper treatment of animais is itself a
value, adhered to strongly by certam groups in contemporary society, even if — as I hold — it is one subordinate to
the value of human life and well-being Smce it is a value,
due respect should be paid to it in the course of scientific
research Thence, e g, subordinate to the requirements of
sound research, animais should be used to the =mal extent possible, their suffenng avoided where possible, and
they should be kept in decent conditions They should not
be used as experimental subjects if alternative methods are
available, if the research in question (e g, that mvolved m
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testing new cosmetics) is monvated by market-dnven considerations that have httle to do with satisfying human
needs, or if it (e g, that aiming to "improve" biological
weapons) occurs within projects that are morally abhorrent
Frequently it is said that there are too many "useless"
expenments conducted upon animais No doubt it is true
that many expenments simply disconfirm proposed hypotheses, replicate previous results, or fail to constitute advancements of knowledge or to engender applications that
enhance human well being That does not imply that they
are "useless" (though some certainly are) for it is an integral
part of the process of science that one cannot know m advance what will be the positive outcomes of research, otherwise there would be no need for expenments On the
other hand if it could be shown that relevant research (in a
particular arca) could be carned out productively without
(or with less) use of animal subjects, then the argument
about "useless" expenments would be strengthened Certainly a strong case can be made, especially now that sophisticated computer simulanons are available, that the
regular use of animais in the routine experimental components of saence courses is problematic — except in those
relatively few cases where mastery of the experimental
technique is necessary for the subsequent experimental or
professional career of the student
Too often the issue is put either autonomy of research
practices or animal nghts, instead of recognizing that two
germine values are in play and then addressing their proper
balance and relative subordmation (In the case of autonomy
only a hmited version can be defended, and then only with
quahfications — SVF ch 10) Looked at this way, responsible advocates for animal nghts could play a constructive
role by putting energy into attempts to create alternative
research methodologies, and responsible saentific institu-
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tions will themseives regulate the use of animais in research
1 suggest that the state should assume a regulatory role only
when it is clearly demonstrated that the self-regulation of
scientific institutions is detective Then, the responsible selfregulation of scientific institutions, rather than their engaging in defensive cnticism of the behavior and tactics of
those who pnontize other values, would be the best and
most credible affirmation of the value of autonomy of scientific

Appenduc 2: on departures from impartrality
m actual scientific practice
If Principie 1 is to be adhered to rt is vitally important to
diagnose the mechanisms that can be found ia saentific
practices that underhe departures from impartiallty When
Impartiality is violated we would not expect to find moral
and social values bemg put expliatly into play alongside the
cognitive values More subtle mechanisms are likely to be
involved In the mam text [atter the introduction of the
subsidiary principie 1(a)] one mechanism has aiready been
identified where conditions make it difficult to separate
judgments of acceptance and significance of theones, enabling some theones to be rejected because of their lack of
significance
A second mechanism is de facto to include among the
cognitive vaiues consistency with religious or metaphysical
(dialectical or "vulgar" matenalist) viewpoints exemplified
respectively ia the Church/Gahleo episode, the Lysenko
affair, and the common insistence in cognitive science that
intentional emp lanation must be reduable to or replaceable
by accounts gamed under matenalist strategies Consistency
with matenalist metaphysics (of any vanety) is not a cognitive value, though it may serve as a heunstic connected
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with stances that may be adopted towards theones prior to
their acceptance or rejection In contrast "Consistency with
soundly accepted theones that are developed under matenalist (or any other) strategies” is a cognitive value When a
metaphysical viewpoint has a pervasive gnp on the imaginations of a culture, it may be difficult to discern this
mechanism in play (SVF ch 6, especially 126-30), and
when rt is endorsed by a repressive power it may be difficult
to resist Sometimes consistency with a particular metaphysical viewpomt (matenahsm, behavionsm) becomes considered essential to the airns of science, then, e g, science is
considered to be not only systematic empincal inquiry but
also conducted under particular versions of matenalist
strategies Symptom of this mechanism being in play results are over-generahzed, a subset of possibilities is identified with the totality of possibihties
A third mechamsm Research is conducted within an
ongomg tradition of inquiry whose strategies are linked
with particular values — but where the researchers perceve
themselves to be attempting to make sense of the accumulated data, unaware of the play of strategies and that the
data have been collected under their selective stnctures
This is research that does not appraise the degree of mamfestation of the cognitive values, especially empincal adequacy, agamst the toughest standards (SVF 62-6) Symptom theoretical conclusions are drawn that remforce particular "biases " Ask Has a suffiaent vanety of kinds of
data been gathered? And have a sufficient range of theoremai competitors been worked out enough to be put into
senous competition with it? The absence of competrtors
(with some degree of empincal support) by itself does not
mean that the theory has been accepted in accord with impartiality (SVF ch 9) Relations of power may account for
the absence of well worked out alternatives, rather than the
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cognitive deficits of nascent alternatives, or from the perspective of alternative value-outlooks and the strategies
hnked with them, certam kmds of "data" may be simply
uninteresting
These three mechamsms can be in play while researchers
maintain an "honest" commitment to the "scientific ethos"
(Cupom 1998) Additional mechanisms are not consistent
with there being such honesty (a) Data that does not meet
minimum standards of acceptabihty may be added to the
array considered for the sake of quantitatwely bolstering
the case (b) Research results may be withheld from publication when they are "inconvement", or research that might
produce "inconvement" results is not conducted — symptom applications are defended from allegations of harmful
side-effects simply by appeal to "there is no scientific evidence that there are such effects", or there may be outright
deceit
Scientific judgments that accord with imparttaltty can be
made only when none of these mechanisms are sigmficant
causal factors rn making them As already mentioned, not
ali scientific judgments do accord with zmpartiality Social
and historical studies of science can help us discern which
ones do and which do not — they can provide explanations
of why certam theories are accepted by members of the saentific commumty despite not accordmg with impartiality
In this way the empirical scrutiny of scientific practices and
the making of scientific judgments contributes to the "logic
of appraisal" of theories 'There is an extreme position
(nicely critiozed by Hackmg 1999 and Kitcher 1998) that
holds that these (and perhaps additional comparable)
mechanisms are always in play, so that no theory is accepted in accord with tmparttality, thence we can only expiam theory acceptance, not appraise theories for their
cognitive value (Even when a theory is accepted in accord
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with impartiality, there remams much to be explamed by
social studies — SVF 231-6, Lacey 1999b, c)
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Notes
1 Based on a paper delivered at the "First Principia International
Symposium " Florianopolis, August 9-13, 1999
2 On "acceptance" or "choice" of a theory, and the distinctness of
acceptance from other stances (e g, provisional entertamment,
judge it applicable) that may be taken towards theories, see SVF
13-16, VAC 76
3 My notion of "strategy" is a descendera of Kuhn's "paradigrn"
(SVF 261) It has affinmes with Hacking's (1999) "forms of
knowledge," that would be worth further exploration
4 Most of the forms of knowledge that Hacking (1999) discusses
are (transposed into my termmology) highly restricted versions of
materialist strategies, and social values (which ali deeply mterplay
with the modern valuation of control) play important roles in
their being adopted in inquiry For detailed discussions of materialist strategies and their varmus forms, see SVF
5 See SVF ch 9 for another example of research conducted under strategies, afeminist strategies," not reduable to materialist
ones
6 Mutual remforcement does not imply subordination of scientific research to the objective of control, theories, accepted under
materialist strategies, often provide sound understanding of domams of phenomena in which there is no genume possibility of
exerasing conto!
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7 The account of the modern valuation of control presented here
summarizes material in SVF 110-15 The summary, and the
statement of the presuppositions that follows, is largely borrowed
from Lacey 1999c Throughout the art.& there are also other
inevitable points of overlap with Lacey 1999c, which is concerned with the appraisal of the view that sctence is value free —
whereas this paper is concerned with the normative principies to
adopt after having made this appraisal The concerns of both
articles draw upon the same lines of argument and use example
of BT and AE
8 I have In mind here espectally the values carried by vartous
popular organizations In Latm America (VAC ch 1, SVF ch
8)

